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In today’s modern and highly technical society, which is characterized by a di-
vision of labor, the population is supplied with goods and services it needs by 
means of a highly developed and closely linked network of components consti-
tuting our critical infrastructure. These include information technology and tel-
ecommunications, transportation and traffic, energy supply, and the health care 
system. The internal complexity and great interdependence of these components 
make them extremely vulnerable. It has not just been in the past decade that ter-
ror attacks, natural disasters, and extremely grave accidents have made apparent 
which far-reaching consequences the impairment of our critical infrastructure 
can have for our entire society.
Due to the fact that electrically powered equipment has almost completely pen-
etrated the environments in which we live and work, the consequences of a 
prolonged and widespread power outage would amount to a particularly serious 
hazardous situation. It would affect each component of our critical infrastruc-
ture, and it would be nearly impossible to prevent a collapse of all of society. 
Despite the potential impact of these dangers and disasters, the social awareness 
of these risks is still in its infancy.
The office of Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag (TAB) was com-
missioned of the Committee on Education, Research, and Technology Assess-
ment to analyze the consequences of a prolonged and widespread power outage. 
Another objective was to demonstrate the possibilities and the limitations of the 
national system of disaster management to cope with such a large-scale emer-
gency.
DISASTER MANAGEMENT IN GERMANY
The highly developed German system of disaster management is characterized 
by the division of tasks between the federal and state governments that is an-
chored in the German Constitution. A consequence of the fact that the responsi-
bility for disaster managment is shared by the federal government and the states, 
with the former responsible for civil protection and the latter for disaster protec-
tion in peacetime, is a field of policy that consists of several tiers and numerous 




Numerous laws and regulations define the fields of responsiblity and possible 
measures. An important foundation for operative disaster management is the 
federal law on civil protection and disaster relief (Gesetz über den Zivilschutz 
und die Katastrophenhilfe des Bundes). Its latest version, from July 29, 2009, 
attempts to achieve a closer integration of federal and state resources. The feder-
al government supplements the states’ structures for disaster relief in numerous 
areas. At the same time, the states’ institutions and staffs can also be employed 
to defend against dangers to national defense. A number of laws featuring pro-
tective and preventive measures provide extensive options for managing scarce 
structures, goods, and services, for example in the areas of nutrition, traffic, 
postal services, and telecommunications. Also of particular importance are the 
state laws regulating emergency assistance and civil defense. They regulate in 
particular the organization and tasks of the civil defense authorities and list 
the measures that can be taken in response to an emergency. Since an estimated 
80% of the components of our critical infrastructures are privately owned, it is 
desirable for there to be a strong security partnership between government and 
companies.
Also relevant might be Germany’s membership in the European Union’s (EU) 
civil protection mechanism, which was established in 2002 to promote coopera-
tion in emergency responses within the EU. Germany has furthermore concluded 
numerous bilateral agreements on disaster relief.
The initial response to the consequences of a power outage is the task of the 
local authorities, institutions, and organizations. Due to the situation (going be-
yond the regional level) and its development (prolonged with significant conse-
quences), gradually the next higher levels up to federal ministries become active. 
Responsibility thus resides with the higher disaster protection authorities, who 
assign the (operative) execution of the necessary measures to the lower (local) 
disaster protection authorities.
To coordinate this heterogeneous constellation of actors with their different 
styles of leadership and communication in a widespread and prolonged power 
outage, a crisis team has to be created at every level (municipal, state, and fed-
eral). Coordination across state borders is necessary to harmonize the different 
activities of relief organizations (e. g., the German branch of the Red Cross, the 
Maltese Aid Service, and fire departments) and of support organizations (The 
Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), the federal police, and the German 
army). It is presumably inevitable that at least the coordinating activities will be 
at the federal level.
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To this end, there are various systems and procedures for obtaining, processing, 
and distributing information. One example is the Internet-based German Emer-
gency Preparedness Information System (deNIS), which serves to provide infor-
mation to the public (deNIS I) and to directly manage information about major 
disasters (deNIS II plus). Another is a satellite-based warning system (SatWaS), 
which makes it possible for warnings to be distributed nationwide to all the sit-
uation rooms, civil protection liaison offices, radio broadcasters, and other me-
dia. The joint reporting and incident centre (GMLZ) of the federal government 
and states essentially serves to establish a uniform overview of the situation.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF A PROLONGED AND WIDESPREAD POWER 
OUTAGE
The possible causes of a prolonged and multiregional power outage include tech-
nical and human failure, criminal or terrorist action, an epidemic, a pandemic, 
or an extreme weather event. Many expect that the probability of an outage 
will increase in the future, for example because of the increased danger of a 
grid breakdown caused by a terrorist attack or climate-related extreme weather 
events. On the basis of experience gained from previous national and interna-
tional power outages, substantial damage can be expected. Although previous 
outages did not last longer than a few days, some have caused expenses esti-
mated at several billion US dollars. The damages caused by a multiweek power 
outage are expected to be several magnitudes higher.
The dependence of the different sectors of the critical infrastructure on a con-
tinuous power supply is comprehensive. The consequences of a scenario of a 
power outage that lasts at least two weeks and affects an area made up of several 
German states would come close to being a catastrophe. We will describe this in 
detail in the following section.
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND TELECOMMUNICATION
The consequences of a widespread and prolonged power outage for information 
technology and telecommunications would have to be characterized as dramat-
ic. Some of the telecommunications and data services would be lost immediately, 
and the rest would be after just a few days.
In the complex topology of information and telecommunications networks, 
there are different degrees of dependence on an external power supply. In the 
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landline telephone networks, (digital) terminal devices and the customer connec-
tion are lost immediately, followed by the local exchanges. In the mobile phone 
networks, the terminal devices are less affected, which might be able to function 
for several days if they are loaded and used in moderation, than the base sta-
tions that make it possible for anyone to dial into the network. As a result of 
the increased volume of calls, these stations are usually overloaded within a few 
minutes, or they are lost entirely because the emergency power supply is only 
available short term. The mass media are of special significance for communi-
cation with the public during a crisis. Some newspaper publishers and printers 
have emergency power systems, enabling them to contribute to providing infor-
mation to the public to a certain degree. The public broadcasting stations are 
better prepared for a power outage and can continue broadcasting. Yet without 
electricity the public will not be able to view any programs on their televisions. 
In the event of a crisis, radio will consequently become one of the most impor-
tant channels for providing the public with information since there are millions 
of radios that run on standard or rechargeable batteries.
For communication between the authorities, no one estimate can be made that is 
equally accurate for all participants and networks. For example, the federal gov-
ernment’s communication networks, such as the information network Berlin–
Bonn (IVBB) and the information network of the federal government (IVBV), 
can continue functioning as a rule for two to three days by using emergency 
power generators. This is insufficient however to sustain communication on a 
broad scale.
Vulnerability and coping capacities
The capacities of the mobile radio technology and of the landline means of com-
munication of the army, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief, and the tele-
communications companies that are equipped with emergency power sources 
are presumably primarily planned to meet their own needs. They are not de-
signed for guaranteeing the ability of the authorities, the public, and companies 
to communicate over a broad area.
Just the first few days of a prolonged and widespread power outage will show 
that the telecommunications providers will not be able to provide the minimal 
level of telecommunications services that is planned and legally required for an 
emergency. The reserve capacities maintained for central communication insti-
tutions, such as uninterrupted power supply (UPS) and emergency power gener-
ation, will be exhausted after just a few hours or days or have no effect because 
terminal devices will have stopped working.
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Thus the possibility for the public to communicate actively and in dialogue by 
means of telephone and Internet will be lost within a very short period of time. 
The multitude of electrically powered network nodes, switching stations, and 
radio antennas for landline and mobile phone services and use of the Internet 
means that their widespread reactivation will be practically impossible. This 
would require thousands of storage batteries to be charged and fuel tanks to be 
supplied. At the very most, it is conceivable that there is a partial reactivation of 
individual components of the infrastructure at the fringes of the area affected by 
the power outage. The loss of the communications infrastructure will also affect 
the authorities and emergency workers, who will demand priority in using any 
remaining or locally reestablished possibilities for communication.
Currently it is presumably economically and technically impossible to ensure 
sustainable functioning of the communications networks that would make it 
possible to maintain a stable and comprehensive range of services for customers. 
As far as is visible, no plans have been developed for at least offering a specified 
minimum level of service if there is a prolonged power outage.
The need for information and action
The above evaluation of the vulnerability of the information technology and 
telecommunications sector and of the capacities at its disposal for coping with 
a prolonged and widespread power outage is fraught with numerous uncertain-
ties. There is thus obviously a need for further information and research.
 > In principle, the minimum level of communication needed in the situation descri-
bed here must be evaluated, in order to be able to then determine the technical 
boundary conditions for different levels of service.The respective subordinate 
issues would include an estimate of the customary volume of the communica-
tion and data streams and the determination of the redundancies that are pre-
sent and of the network segments and nodes that are critical for its operation.
 > Furthermore, the existing plans for emergency service in the field of informati-
on technology and telecommunications could be examined and new, improved 
approaches developed. To achieve this, it would be necessary to prepare an 
overview of the emergency power supplies available to the various communi-
cations networks and services. The same is true for the capacities and usage op-
tions of the emergency standby telecommunications systems that can be emplo-
yed on a mobile basis and supplied with emergency power. This would make it 
possible to specify the technical parameters that are necessary for maintaining 




 > Moreover, possible adjustments to the legally prescribed preparedness measu-
res are to be examined. The goal of such legal analyses should be to identify 
approaches for strengthening the resilience of the information technology and 
telecommunications sector during a power outage.
 > Finally, prospective analyses of the sector’s underlying conditions should be 
considered. Topics should include technological innovation (e. g., electromobi-
lity, intelligent networks) as well as political (e. g., liberalization, privatization, 
and deregulation), economic (e. g., the multitude of competing providers, the 
rapid changes in products), and sociocultural changes (e. g., modified forms of 
communication and the use of media by the public). To be studied in this con-
text would be whether research and development processes could be sponsored 
in order to develop applications of information technology and telecommuni-
cations that are less dependent on the power grid.
TRANSPORTATION AND TRAFFIC
In the transportation and traffic sector, the electrically powered elements of the 
infrastructure related to movement on streets, tracks, in the air or water are 
lost immediately or within a few hours. This affects both the means of trans-
portation and the infrastructure as well as the control and organization of the 
respective mode of transportation. The abrupt stoppage of rail traffic and the 
blockage of motorized private and public transportation in heavily populated 
areas will create hot spots of emergencies. While the operation of harbors will 
almost completely come to a halt, that of airports proves to be relatively robust 
and sustainable.
Immediately after a power outage, road traffic is chaotic, particularly in large 
cities. Intersections are blocked, just as are numerous tunnels and gates. Long 
backlogs of traffic are the result. There are numerous accidents, some causing 
injuries and fatalities. It is very difficult for emergency services to do their tasks 
properly, such as providing care and transportation for the injured or fighting 
fires. Since most service stations are closed, an increasing number of vehicles 
have to stop. The amount of motorized personal traffic declines rapidly after the 
first 24 hours. Because of the shortage of fuel, it is at most possible to maintain 
a rudimentary form of local public transportation. Traffic on major highways is 
less affected over the entire period of the power outage.
A power outage abruptly stops electrically powered rail traffic. Many people are 
trapped in subways and trains. The functioning of control centers, interlockings, 
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and safety systems are drastically limited. The impairment of rail traffic poses a 
massive obstruction to people’s mobility.
In the area of air transportation, emergency standby systems and fuel reserves 
ensure the basic operation of the larger airports for the entire period of the pow-
er outage. A limited number of take-offs and landings can ake place.
The extensive consequences of a power outage for shipping are particularly evi-
dent in harbors. There the power outage interrupts the loading and unloading of 
ships since, for example, the conveyer belts and the electrically powered cranes 
no longer operate. All processes come to a standstill, the entire operation of the 
harbor comes to a halt, and there are backlogs of goods. While the effect of the 
stoppage at the inland harbors is primarily regional, the stoppage at seaports is 
felt throughout Germany and even all over Europe since they are transshipment 
points for national and international goods.
Vulnerability and coping capacities
The consequences of a power outage occur abruptly and are massive. Substan-
tial restrictions of mobility and of the transportation of goods result from nu-
merous accidents, stranded trains and subways, rerouted flights, and backlogs 
of trucks and goods in harbors. The backlogs and accidents in road traffic lead 
to chaotic conditions, particularly in metropolitan and urban areas. Fire fight-
ing, emergency rescues, and ambulance services are massively obstructed, as are 
efforts to ensure the emergency power supply and numerous other measures for 
coping with the general situation. Since all service stations are out of order, there 
is a shortage of fuel for emergency vehicles. There is furthermore the threat of 
substantial shortages in the supply of, for example, food and medical items to 
the public.
The authorities and relief organizations are consequently confronted by com-
plex challenges. Locally, the supply of fuel to emergency personel, emergency 
power generators, and particularly sensitive components of the critical infra-
structure (such as emergency control centers, water works, and hospitals) must 
be arranged. It is necessary for important road and rail arteries to be cleared, for 
some to be closed, and for some traffic to be banned, to ensure that these routes 
are cleared and kept free for emergency workers. Finally, it is important to es-
tablish supraregional axes of transportation and make transportation capacities 
available in order to make it possible to supply essential goods, in particular by 
rail. To achieve this, the relevant authorities have to determine during the course 
of the power outage, in collaboration with logistic companies and rail operators, 
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which routes should be kept open and which measures have to be implemented 
to ensure emergency operation.
In the air traffic subsector, some routine take-offs and landings can take place 
as a result of an extensive emergency power supply. The German Air Naviga-
tion Services will, however, quickly reduce or suspend air movement, and the 
airlines will reroute flights into regions not affected by the power outage. Basic 
operations must be maintained in airports, such as maintaining security on their 
grounds and providing necessities to waiting passengers. Additionally, it is being 
investigatet whether flights, perhaps under visual flight conditions, can be main-
tained to provide supplies to the people affected.
In view of the massive obstructions at the inland harbors and seaports in the 
water subsector, the respective harbor authorities will attempt to reduce activity 
at the harbors and to resolve backlogs. They will also contact ships and the un-
affected harbors in Germany and Europe and communicate with the responsible 
authorities in order to reroute the transportation of goods and have it transport-
ed by road or rail. The fire departments and the Federal Agency for Technical 
Relief may be employed, for example to erect mobile aggregates to establish a 
temporary power supply or to act in case there are dangerous situations in con-
nection with hazardous goods. The failure of information and communications 
technology will cause substantial difficulties in this connection.
WATER SUPPLY AND SEWAGE DISPOSAL
Nutritionally water cannot be replaced, and it is a guarantee for a minimum 
standard of hygiene. As such, it is a resource that is essential for satisfying basic 
human needs. Water is also of major significance for business, trade, industry, 
and public facilities. Without electricity, it becomes impossible after a very short 
period of time to operate the water infrastructure systems. The consequences of 
their failure, especially for supplying the public with potable water, would be 
catastrophic.
In the field of water supply, electric power is necessary to raise, process, and 
distribute water. Electrically powered pumps are especially critical for ensuring 
each of these functions. If they fail, it is no longer possible to pump ground wa-
ter, and getting water from surface sources is then at least strongly obstructed. 
Furthermore, processing plants and the distribution system can only be fed if 
there is a natural gradient (i. e., a difference in elevations), so that significantly 
less water can be made available and higher regions cannot be supplied at all.
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The reduced supply of water also affects sewage disposal. For example, the 
amount of waste water itself declines, and its composition changes. There is 
consequently a danger that the highly concentrated sewage might lead to the cre-
ation of deposits in the sewage system and resultin blockages and odors. Since 
the pumps that raise sewage to a higher elevation are frequently not backed up 
by emergency power generators, new sewage can escape from the pipes. Sewage 
treatment plants as a rule do have emergency power generators that can support 
full-load operation. If the emergency power generators fail, the sewage will have 
to be diverted from the treatment plants and fed into surface waters. This results 
in immediate damage of the environment.
An interruption of the water supply has a comprehensive effect on home life. 
Customary body care cannot be carried out, and in the majority of households 
there is no warm water. The preparation of food and drinks is strongly limited, 
and it is impossible to flush a toilet. We have to expect these problems to become 
more severe as the length of the power outage increases. Soon people will not 
have any clean clothes, and hygiene becomes precarious. Toilets are clogged. 
There is a growing danger that illnesses will spread. Another, less immediate 
consequence of the power outage is an increasing risk of fires. They may occur 
in industry, e. g., as a consequence of the loss of cooling systems and process 
control systems, and in households as a result of attempts to cook, heat, or make 
light without any electricity. A consequence of the reduced water supply or its 
complete loss is that fire fighting is obstructed. This raises the danger in cities – 
because of the population density – that fires might spread to blocks of houses 
or possibly even to entire districts of cities.
Vulnerability and coping capacities
The consequences of a power outage for the water infrastructure systems in 
Germany will vary greatly by location. Yet it can be said that a large number of 
the reservoirs for freshwater that are presently connected to the networks and 
available atplants as well as the emergency power capacity is at most designed 
to bridge supply disturbances lasting less than a few hours.
To cope with the immediate and mediate consequences of a power outage, meas-
ures are needed that entail great efforts in terms of staff, organization, time, 
and material. This includes supplying the public by resorting to emergency 
wells (5.200 in Germany) and the use of mobile sanitary vehicles. Further steps 
concern the maintenance of the operational status of the supply and sewage 
networks at a low level of performance through the use of stop-gap measures 
and the functional replacement of individual power-dependent components and 
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plants. This depends in particular on the mobile use of emergency power genera-
tors. They have to be operated at changing locations, such as with lifting systems 
in the sewage system or with the electrical pumps responsible for supplying wa-
ter. As long as an emergency power supply is available, it is possible to maintain 
the supply of water at a limited level of performance, given limited availability 
in the water system, and/or with a reduced quality of water. The water can then 
be made drinkable by consumers, such as by the use of sterilization agents. It is 
doubtful however whether these measures for coping with the catastrophe can 
be sustained for a longer period of time, particularly in view of the limited ca-
pacities of emergency power generators.
The need for information and action
In view of the paramount significance of the water infrastructure systems for the 
supply of the public, the security plans should be further developed. It is true 
that the regulations of the German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas 
and Water (Deutscher Verband für das Gas- und Wasserfach, DVGW) already 
contain numerous elements of the potable water plan of the World Health Or-
ganization. Yet since the aspect of risk evaluation has hardly been implemented 
in the areas of water raising, water processing, water storage, and water distribu-
tion, there is a need for analyses to make it possible to set priorities regarding the 
measures to be developed. With regard to the existing analyses of vulnerability, 
it can be said that the consequences of a prolonged power outage on the water 
infrastructure have hardly been studied using models. Those models could prove 
to be particularly suitable that conceive of the water infrastructure systems as 
one component of a mesh of interacting infrastructure systems. Their results 
could be of assistance in developing a preventive disaster management system.
The aspects of vulnerability and resilience should be given more prominence in 
plans for future systems. For example, in the area of sewage treatment plants, 
research and development are already being increasingly pursued with the goal 
of increasing energy efficiency and the local production of energy using biogas 
electricity production in combined heat and power plants (CHP). If there is a 
continous growth in the field, even with today’s technology, an autarkic supply 
of conenery is conceivable. Decentralized power generation that is viable as an 
island network could constitute a contribution to an improved resilience in this 
sector after a power outage. The goal of such systems should be to enable sew-
age treatment plants to operate independently and safely in an uncomplicated 
manner. Energy autarky and island network viability should be central elements 
of the infrastructure to be achieved by water works.
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In the short term there is a need for improvements in nonsystemic security plans 
to be carried out. For example, there are substantial deficits in sewage treatment 
plants with regard to their being equipped with systems for uninterrupted power 
supply, to emergency power generators, and to being supplied with fuel (e. g., 
diesel) for a longer period of time.
In the area of fire protection, there are opportunities to reduce vulnerability, 
such as by means of the development and utilization of new technologies that, 
by improving the efficiency in the use of water to fight a fire, reduce the amount 
of water needed.
FOOD
The food sector comprises the complex supply chain from the production of raw 
materials to the consumer’s purchase of finished products. As a consequence of 
a power outage, the supply of food will be significantly disturbed. Making food 
available as it is needed and ensuring its distribution to the public will be prima-
ry tasks of the authorities. Not only will the survival of numerous people depend 
on their success in this endeavor, but also the maintenance of public safety.
Within the first few days, the lack of air conditioning and ventilation will lead to 
disruptions in the greenhouse production of fruit and vegetables and in the abil-
ity to store goods. With regard to animals, the technical functions in the stable 
that are important for the life and health of animals will initially be maintained 
by (prescribed) emergency power generators. The failure of further technology 
in the stable and milking systems will however affect the well being of the ani-
mals and possibly result in bovine mastitis in dairy cattle and subsequently lead 
to their death. As soon as the fuel supply of the emergency power generators 
is exhausted, which is usually after 24 hours, the animals will suffer from the 
lack of food, water, and fresh air that cannot be provided manually. Most prob-
lematic is the capacity to supply stocks of pigs and chickens numbering several 
thousand animals. In such circumstances, the animals will often not even survive 
the first few hours.
Most of the food processing industry will immediately stop working, interrupt-
ing the supply to commercial warehouses. Although these warehouses keep very 
large supplies of food products, they are primarily in the form of frozen foods. 
Very few of the warehouses will be able to maintain the necessary supply of 
emergency power for longer than two days. This will cause a massive disruption 
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in the turnover of goods and thus in the supply of stores. The shelves of the 
stores will be emptied within a few days.
VULNERABILITY AND COPING CAPACITIES
Confronted by the increased demand, the food trade proves to be the weakest 
link in the food supply chain. Serious shortages in the supply of food can be ex-
pected after just a few days. In pursuing the goal of overcoming the catastrophe, 
the authorities could for example decide on the following measures:
 > On the basis of the Food Provision Act (Ernährungsvorsorgegesetz), the rati-
oned release of the stock of the Civilian Emergency Reserve and the Federal 
Grain Reserve is decided. These reserves will be further processed, where pos-
sible, and distributed via establishments known as collective provision institu-
tions (or soup kitchens).
 > On the basis of the Transportation Availability Act (Verkehrsleistungsgesetz), 
transportation capacities are made available. Supplementing this, commercial 
businesses initiate an intensified transregional supply of the region affected.
 > In selected food stores, food distribution points are created. These are equip-
ped with emergency generators and taken into consideration in the allocation 
of fuel. The respective companies coordinate the necessary logistics with the 
authorities.
 > Since a large portion of the population does not have any opportunity to pre-
pare a warm meal, communal kitchens are created, such as by the Federal 
Agency for Technical Relief, the German Red Cross, and the German army, 
and warm meals are made available.
Despite the greatest efforts, it is very probable that distribution of food as need-
ed throughout the area affected will be very unsatisfactory. Communication be-
tween central offices, warehouses, and stores will be significantly obstructed by 
the loss of telecommunications connections. The authorities’ management of the 
catastrophe will be significantly limited by the lack of a commonly shared un-
derstanding of the situation, drastically obstructing the multistate planning and 
coordination of measures.
The need for information and action
Starting points for precautionary measures to strengthen the resilience of this 
sector would above all be the main regional commercial warehouses and possi-
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bly selected stores. They could be equipped with robust emergency power gen-
erators. If current feed points are available, an option would be to use mobile 
generatorsbut its functioning would have to be guaranteed for a longer period 
of time. Another possible option would be for the central warehouses to be sup-
plied by their own locally generated power using regenerative sources of energy, 
which would create a high degree of autarky.
Public–private security partnerships could be examined as a means to strength-
ening the resilience of this sector. The starting point could for example be a plan 
in which the attempt is made within the framework of an agreement with com-
mercial businesses to create a disasterproof store for every 10.000 inhabitants 
and a food warehouse in every state that would be equipped with comprehensive 
stocks of food, means of communication, and emergency power generators. It 
would make sense to consider the creation of decentralized power generators 
at appropriate locations that are capable of islanding and that use regenerative 
sources of energy. They would be listed in a central database, with whose help 
the authorities and companies could coordinate deliveries in the case of a ca-
tastrophe.
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
Nearly all institutions providing medical and pharmaceutical care to the public 
are directly dependent on electricity. The health care system, which is organized 
in a decentralized manner and based strongly on a division of labor, can only 
withstand the consequences of a power outage for a short period of time. Even 
if intensive use was made of regional capacities for providing assistance, within a 
week, the situation deteriorates to such a degree that we can assume there would 
be a broad breakdown in the supply of medical and pharmaceutical care.
After just 24 hours the functioning of the health care system will be significantly 
impaired. While emergency power generators make it possible for hospitals to 
maintain limited operation, at least some dialysis centers, homes for the aged, 
and nursing homes will have to be vacated [evacuated] and close some depart-
ments. Most doctor’s offices and pharmacies cannot continue operation without 
electricity and will close.
A shortage of pharmaceuticals will develop in the course of the first week since 
the production and distribution of pharmaceutical products will not be possible 
in the region affected by the power outage. The stocks of hospitals and of the 
pharmacies that remain open will become increasingly incomplete. In particular, 
14
SUMMARY
pharmaceuticals that are perishable will only be available – if at all – in hos-
pitals. The shortages of insulin, banked blood, and dialysis fluids will have a 
dramatic impact.
Vulnerability and coping capacities
After just a few days, the decentrally structured sector is swamped in its efforts 
to cope with the consequences of the power outage. The operational capacity 
of the health care sector will be reduced not only by the increasing depletion of 
its internal capacities, but also by the failure of other facets of the critical infra-
structure. Deficits in the supply of, for example, water, food, and communica-
tion and transportation services will intensify thedecrease in the quantity and 
quality of medical care.
The emergency services can only be employed to a limited extent for transport-
ing and evacuating people. The impaired communications infrastructure largely 
cuts them off from emergency calls from the public. The coordination of as-
signments also becomes more difficult , if not impossible. Problems also result 
from the dwindling availability of fuel. Preclinical medical care is thus massively 
obstructed.
There is a threat that the care primarily provided by hospitals will collapse. 
Some hospitals will initially be able to maintain a limited capacity to provide 
care, which makes them the core nodes of medical care. They usually have a 
certain stock of medication and sufficient staff and fuel. The medical staff in 
outpatient care will support the work of the hospitals. Yet this relatively good 
status will lead patients to resort to them when other institutions (such as homes 
for the aged, nursing homes, and dialysis centers) have to close. This will raise 
the threat that the remaining capacities will collapse. Although the emergency 
plans of hospitals envisage the release of as many patients as possible, the cat-
astrophic conditions outside the hospitals mean that only those patients can be 
released that can take care of themselves on their own. The first aid provided by 
the German army as part of the Civilian–Military Cooperation will provide at 
most local relief.
At the latest by the end of the first week, a catastrophe can be expected, that is, 
damage to the health and even the death of a large number of people as well as 
a situation that cannot be handled by the means and personnel available locally 
and regionally. The provision of medical and pharmaceutical care is no longer 
possible without the input of additional medical supplies, infrastructure compo-
nents, and trained personnel from the outside.
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The need for information and action
As anchors in the system providing medical care to the public, hospitals play a 
pivotal role. Although we can attest them a certain amount of robustness, it will 
not suffice to compensate for the loss of all the other institutions, in particular of 
decentralized out-patient care. Hence, it is necessary to ensure a continuous sup-
ply of fuel for the existing emergency power generators. Two means to achieve 
this to a limited extent are the storage of fuel on the grounds and agreements 
with suppliers (who will probably hardly be able to provide deliveries given 
the general consequences of a power outage). [Feeding points for an emergency 
power supply should be part of planning as a matter of principle. Finally, the 
civil defense authorities should determine that hospitals are entitled to be giv-
en priority in the allocation of fuel. A more far-reaching starting point is the 
creation of as high a degree of energy self-sufficiency and islanding as possible, 
such as has already been achieved to some extent in the context of steps toward 
environmental protection and measures to lower the consumption of energy. To 
ensure the supply of potable water to hospitals, the possibilities for processing 
and transporting water from emergency wells to hospitals or auxiliary hospitals 
should be examined more intensely.
Increased stockpiling of medical supplies could constitute a significant contri-
bution to strengthening their resilience. Further exceptions in the German Med-
icines Act (Arzneimittelgesetz) might also be considered for emergencies and 
catastrophes. The goal would have to be practical regulations for a prolonged 
emergency and for supplying the public. Finally, it appears to be essential for 
manufacturers, wholesalers, and pharmacies to be included in the disaster re-
sponse. The precondition would be that these actors would have to take pre-
cautionary measures to maintain production and distribution in the case of a 
prolonger power outage. The (legal) form in which this could be implemented 
would have to be examined.
FINANCIAL SERVICES
Even in a widespread and prolonged power outage, individual segments of the 
financial services system will prove to be relatively robust. According to esti-
mates of experts, the data traffic and payment transactions between banks, the 
clearing houses, and the exchanges are guaranteed for a long time by emergency 
power sources and could also be moved to an unaffected area. The same is true 
of data storage and other critical business processes. The measures planned in 
the exchanges for an emergency are adequate from a technical, staffing, and 
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organizational perspective to ensure operation essentially throughout the entire 
length of the power outage.
Vulnerability and coping capacities
Less robust are the paths of communication between the banks, clearing houses, 
and trading centers on the one hand and the persons and companies seeking 
financial services on the other. Because of the failure of the telephone network 
and the Internet, it will be impossible after just a short period of time to carry 
out any financial transactions. Many of the banks that stay open after the power 
outage begins will close after several days. Since automatic teller machines (cash 
points) also do not function, there is a threat that the supply of cash to the public 
will collapse. It can be assumed that this and the failure of the means for making 
electronic payments in stores and banks will with time lead to resentment and 
some aggressive altercations since the public cannot find any possibilities for 
making payments.
The Achilles heel of the sector proves to be the lack of possibilities for making 
payments electronically and the public’s dwindling supply of cash. This enhanc-
es the public’s uncertainty. People fear that they will not be able to obtain food 
and other essential goods. It thus becomes increasingly important for custom-
ers to be informed and for there to be appropriate communication about risks, 
which should be made in consultation with the civil defense authorities.
The need for information and action
The German Central Bank is faced with the task, in cooperation with other or-
ganizations and emergency workers in civil defense, to ensure at least the rudi-
mentary supply of cash to the public. Banks must be a part of this. A comprehen-
sive organizational and logistics plan for the delivery and distribution of the cash 
would be necessary. An extended safety plan would also have to be developed 
since it is questionable whether the private security providers could adequately 
safeguard the intensive delivery of cash.
CASE STUDY »PRISONS«
Emergency power generators will enable prisons to initially maintain the prima-
ry functions of their operation. These functions are primarily the safekeeping of 
prisoners and their provision with essentials (lighting, ventilation, heating). The 
first phase of the power outage is the most chaotic. Particularly problematic is a 
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power outage that takes place in the daytime since a large number of prisoners 
are outside their cells. All security devices, facilities for building services, com-
puter facilities, and the means of communication will no longer be available. 
This makes it necessary to keep the prisoners in their cells continuously. In ad-
dition to the resulting psychic stress, the prisoners may exhibit health problems 
from the worsening hygienic conditions, insufficient supply of food, and lack of 
heating.
The staff at prisons will also increasingly be under pressure and overtired. Fur-
thermore, because of the traffic problems, some of the staff will arrive at work 
late or not come at all. Overall this will raise the danger of disobedience and 
unrest. The impact of the power outage on other sectors means that police and 
other support workers will presumably not be able to provide relief. Ensuring 
the supply of fuel to the emergency power generators is the highest priority. This 
is essential to make it possible for the prison to continue (reduced) operation 
and to ensure adequate control of the prisoners. Even if this succeeds, a situa-
tion will develop that can hardly be contained, especially as a result of problems 
in providing for needs, such as hygiene and medical care. The situation will be 
aggravated if the number of prisoners grows as a result of increased criminal 
activity and arrests in the region affected.
Vulnerability and coping capacities
The fuel reserves at the prisons will probably suffice for a few days. To ensure 
the emergency power supply, it is absolutely necessary for mobile power genera-
tors to be made available and for additional amounts of fuel to be delivered. It is 
almost imperative for the prisoners to be transferred to other prisons outside the 
affected region (and whose capacities have not been exceeded) if the emergency 
power supply is endangered.
Even if the emergency power continues to function, security and health issues 
will raise questions within a few days about the ability to keep a prison open 
[operatiting]. For this reason and because of the danger of prison escapes, a 
decision must be made about evacuating the prison, and the necessary arrange-
ments must be made. This could be affected by massive coordination problems 
resulting from the failure of landline and mobile phones. It is further doubtful 
whether sufficient and appropriate transportation capacity, including the neces-
sary security personnel, is available.
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The need for information and action
Explicit legal regulations of the emergency power supply of prisons cannot be 
found. Whether at the level of administrative rules or as a consequence of the 
state laws governing disaster protection and emergency assistance, it was impos-
sible to clarify with certainty if there are relevant stipulations. It is also unclear 
if a prolonged power outage is part of the emergency plans of prisons or of the 
alarm and action plans of the lower-level disaster protection authorities, and if 
appropriate exercises take place with external support organizations. The need 
for further information and legal clarification will result in]unusual measures 
that may become necessary, such as the decision not to house day-release prison-
ers or to selectively release certain groups of prisoners (prison furlough).
The sector-based perspective in the analysis of consequences has made apparent 
how limited the coping capacities are. The significant interdependence of the 
sectors also further reduces their perseverance and limits the options of the relief 
systems. In the following, this assessment will be further substantiated, and sev-
eral conclusions will be drawn that span several sectors.
BEHAVIOR
Collapse of the power supply will raise questions about everyday actions and 
will mean that customary means of communication are largely unusable. The 
dangers and uncertainties tied to this will make people feel insecure and destroy 
their conviction that their living conditions can be controlled. This will be ag-
gravated by the fact that the people affected will be unprepared for the power 
outage, the length of which will be unknown. Feelings of helplessness and stress 
will develop if supplies are interrupted, information is unavailable, and public 
order begins to break down.
The consequences of this fear and uncertainty for human behavior are by no 
means uniform. It can rather be expected that there will be a wide spectrum of 
different and even contradictory reactions. Some individuals and groups will 
drop behind the established norms of social life. They will become more reck-
less, aggressive, and prone to violence. The willingness to help others may de-
cline. On the other hand, reactions and forms of behavior such as cooperation, 
empathy, and helpfulness will be seen that give those affected the feeling of being 
able to cope with the catastrophe.
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The members of the relief organizations will experience the consequences of the 
power outage as extreme stress, imposing high physical and psychic burdens. 
Missing resources and inadequate local coordination as well as diverse organ-
izational cultures could cause abnormal behavior when facing danger, impede 
efficient communication and cooperation between the emergency workers, or 
intensify the conflicts between the helpers.
The behavior of groups and individuals in a catastrophe has not yet been ad-
equately studied. For example, there are no analyses of the public’s protective, 
flight, or supportive behavior or of stress accumulation in protracted hazardous 
situations]. At the same time, there are a number of largely questionable assump-
tions, especially regarding the expected, primarily unsocial, apathetic behaviour 
in the public or the outbreak of a panic. This means that further clarification 
is necessary, especially regarding the possible potential of the public to provide 
assistance. Differentiated research steps on the example of a power outage could 
provide a contribution to the analysis of threatening anddeviating behavior of 
humans (that has hardly been a topic in the study of catastrophes) and of its 
causes. The behavior of the helpers should also be an object of study. Above all, 
there is a need for infomation and research on communication and cooperation 
between organizations. Intensified socioscientific and interdisciplinary analysis 
should shed light on the supporting and inhibiting factors of communication.
LEGAL ASPECTS OF COPING WITH A CATASTROPHE
The direct consequences and the chains of consequences resulting from a power 
outage lead to a situation in which a person’s life, physical integrity, and safety 
are profoundly endangered and there is severe material damage. This turns into 
a dangerous and damaging situation in which resources must be mobilized from 
within and beyond the region affected so that the country can fulfill its obli-
gations to provide security. The legislature and the authorities must create the 
necessary legal and regulatory preconditions.
For example, various laws covering precautionary measures provide the foun-
dation for activating different coping capacities to support regional ones. These 
would for example include the following options:
 > Military forces will be mobilized in the framework of Civilian–Military Co-
operation. This will make manpower available to support, e. g., the police, 
the civil defense authorities, and health care institutions, as well as material 
resources. Hospitals and assembly points could for example be equipped with 
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cots and tents, canteens established, or army vehicles used for transportation 
and evacuation.
 > On the basis of the act ensuring postal and telecommunications services (Post- 
und Telekommunikationssicherstellungsgesetz) and a corresponding decree by 
the Federal Ministry of Economy, it is possible for certain, to give largely pub-
lic, agencies privileged access to telecommunications and postal services.
 > To ensure the food supply, according to the precautionary food supply act (Er-
nährungsvorsorgegesetz) and the corresponding state regulations, it is possible 
to draw on the civilian emergency reserve and the federal grain reserve.
 > After the emergency is confirmed by the federal government, the region af-
fected by the crisis could be provided support in the form of transportation 
capacity by private companies on the basis of the transportation act (Verkehrs-
leistungsgesetz). The The Federal Office for Cargo Transportation would make 
this transportation capacity available to those requesting support.
The Federal Ministry of Economy can release, on the basis of the oil provision-
ing actthe fuel reserve in order to ensure the provision with fuel. Fuel can be 
made available and distributed via the railway network using diesel-powered 
engines or with tank trucks.
These measures, together with further state laws and regulations as well as the 
implementation instructions of the authorities, have created the necessary pre-
requisites for mobilizing capacities for coping – including capacities from out-
side the region affected – in a comprehensive yet differentiated manner for both 
specific and multisectoral necessitiesAt the same time, this range of legal mate-
rial appears overly complex and poorly coordinated. For example [instance], 
the legal foundation for disaster management in the health care sector can be 
found in at least eleven federal and state laws and ten administrative regulations] 
and directions. This multitude of instruments must be employed by the actors 
responsible at the different levels in a coordinated and objective manner at the 
right point in time. This can only be achieved successfully if competent experts 
work in the crisis teams who share a common understanding of the legal foun-
dations and if anticipatory measures have been taken regulating the optimal ap-





The task of well-coordinated emergency and crisis management is made even 
more complex by the fact that the relevant nongovernmental actors must be in-
cluded. These include many companies in addition to the energy supply compa-
nies, such as those in the sectors of information and communications, food, and 
security. The multitude and heterogeneity of these companies makes these tasks 
significantly more complicated. One just has to realize, for example, that there 
are 5200 providers and 5900 disposal companies in the water sector and 3000 
service providers in the information technology and telecommunications sector. 
They operate partly locally and partly in more than one region, and the compe-
tence and capacity of each with regard to crisis management vary extremely. The 
multitude and heterogeneity of the potential security partners of the authorities 
lead to the assumption that there is a need for further optimization in selecting 
private security partners at the county and state levels and in integrating them 
into the disaster prevention and response efforts.
NETWORKED DISASTER RESPONSE: COMMUNICATION AND 
COORDINATION
Modern information and communications technology are virtually indispensa-
ble to obtain a commonly shared view of the situation and to coordinate the 
multiple regional and supraregional crisis management teams and emergency 
control centers. Yet because of the power outage it will hardly be possible to 
have recourse to the different facets of the public communications infrastruc-
ture. Furthermore, the coping capacities that are available and the authorities’ 
own communications network are not designed for a prolonged power outage.
 > The communication of the authorities and organizations responsible for secu-
rity tasks will take place via the nonpublic radio network designed for their use 
(BOS). A digital network is to be introduced nationwide by 2012. In terms of 
energy dependence, the modernization of this network means, however, incre-
ases vulnerability in a power outage. While the analog relay stations had an 
emergency power supply for four to eight hours, the base stations in the new 
system have a battery-based supply that is only designed for two hours.
 > The army employs the digital TETRAPOL radio, which supports mobile speech 
and data communications. It is not directly compatible with the BOS network. 
Since deployment of the army is only to be expected after a few days, the BOS 
network will no longer be functioning.
 > The local crisis management teams would also have the option to fall back on 
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mobile radio stations that are independent of the power grid. The telecommu-
nications companies as well as the Federal Agency for Technical Relief and the 
army have emergency standby equipment with which they can establish speech 
and data services and supply it with power from emergency generators. The 
capacity of such power generators of the technical relief agency are however 
limited. This service is intended primarily for communication between crisis 
management teams and emergency control centers. It is unknown what capaci-
ty is at the disposal of the telecommunications companies.
 > Further options in a power outage are the creation of provisional networks 
of field cables, the support of amateur radio users according to §2 Para 2 of 
the Amateur Radio Act, and recourse to satellite communications. Commu-
nication by means of field cables depends on mobile power generators that 
have to be refueled within a short period of time. The energy requirements of 
amateur radio equipment are in contrast very small. Satellite phone systems 
and satellite-based Internet connections offer sufficientcommmunication paths 
if the necessary terrestrial elements (e. g., the ground stations) can be supplied 
with power.
The authorities thus do have the possibility of locally reestablishing individual 
facets of the infrastructure. One option is to supply emergency power to the 
ground stations of the mobile radio system and the mobile-services switching 
center at least on an hourly basis. As soon as a chain can be created with fur-
ther mobile-services switching centers, connections between participants would 
be within reach as well as with regions not affected by the power outage. It 
is doubtful, however, whether this system could provide permanent means of 
communication and connections with further mobile-services switching centers 
within and outside the region affected by the power outage.
For these reasons, it should be assumed that it will not be possible to create a 
commonly shared view of the situation despite intensive efforts to reestablish the 
communications infrastructure. With regard to the technical options that can be 
implemented, their range and time frame are limited.The communication that 
can be created by using them is problematic in nature, and coordination of the 
emergency services and measures that can thus be provided is inadequate. For 




COMMUNICATION WITH THE PUBLIC DURING THE CRISIS
The outages in the information technology and telecommunications sector de-
stroy most of the basis for two-way communication with the public during a 
crisis. Since the remaining or restored means of communication will be used by 
the authorities for the immediate purpose of overcoming damage and coping 
with the catastrophe, communication with the public must in large measure re-
sort to local battery-powered warning systems, radio reports, and loud speaker 
vans. Since radio stations are suitable for broadcasting warning messages and 
information transmitted via the federal satellite-based warning system (SatWaS), 
the authorities will attempt to supply selected stations with emergency power as 
a means of communication during the crisis. Established meeting points, such 
as a mayor’s office, a fire station, or a municipal hall, can – as experience has 
shown – develop into nodes for the distribution of information. Loud speaker 
announcements made by emergency vehicles or patrols operated by the emer-
gency forces constitute further options for meeting the public’s need for infor-
mation.
It is obvious, however, that such a fragmented (one-way form of) communica-
tion can hardly meet the expectations of a continuous and target group-specific 
emergency communication. It will be extremely difficult to convey credibility 
and create confidence if electricity-based forms of communications fail to such a 
degree as described here. It is still largely unclear how such emergency commu-
nication can be organized without electricity. There is thus need for conceptual 
and practicable considerations
THE SUPPLY OF FUEL AND EMERGENCY POWER
The availability of the resource fuel is of primary importance for disaster man-
agement. It is essential, for example, that the following be supplied:
 > Emergency vehicles of the relief organizations and the support organizations
 > Diesel-powered engines for clearing abandoned trains and for the purpose of 
transportation as well as buses for public transportation to maintain some mi-
nimum service
 > Emergency power generators that maintain the functioning of sensitive infra-




The existing coping capacities in the form of fuel reserves generally constitute 
the required preconditions to provide the actors of the crisis management with 
the necessary mobility despite unvafourable circumstances as for example the 
shutdown of service stations. The legally prescribed oil reserves, for example, 
mean that substantial amounts of fuel reserves are available that could meet the 
needs even during a prolonged power outage. Since gasoline and diesel are pri-
marily stored in tanks above ground, it is possible to use the force of gravity to 
fill tank trucks or train tank cars if electricity in not available.
Despite this potential, it is questionable whether these capacities and resources 
can be activated and utilized in a power outage. Considering the impairment of 
the different components of the traffic infrastructure, it is likely that transport 
planes cannot be used quickly and comprehensively enough to prevent shortages 
of fuel, in particular in the urban centers. Finally, the coordination and distribu-
tion of fuel supplies according to an official allocation is an extremely complex 
task, even if one succeeded in obtaining enough tank trucks from the petroleum 
and logistic companies on the basis of the Transportation Availability Act. Since 
an extensive region is affected, it can be expected that there will be both prob-
lems in the determination of who is responsible and logistic challenges. The poor 
possibilities to communicate will aggravate the problem so situations may arise 
in which erroneous or insufficient supplies will be delivered.
Overall it is clear that extensive preparations have been made to ensure the 
availability of logistics services to supply fuel in the case of an emergency. Yet 
under the specific conditions of a power outage, the prompt and well coordinat-
ed activation and distribution of fuel reserves will be a critical factor in coping 
with the consequences.
A starting point for increasing the resilience of the sector would consist in an 
improvement in the resources available at the scene. It could for example be 
planned that selected service stations would be equipped with emergency power 
generators and continuously supplied with fuel. Under the premise that these 
stations are primarily available for the purposes of the authorities and the relief 
organizations, this would reduce the time pressure on supplying the fuel and en-
sure the mobility and capacity of the emergency groups to respond for a certain 
amount of time. To continuously operate emergency power generators, it would 
also be essential for the necessary fuel to be resupplied on schedule to the select-
ed relevant locations critical for security.
25
SUMMARY
ROBUST POWER SUPPLY AFTER A POWER OUTAGE: ISLANDING AS AN 
OPTION
The sustainability of numerous infrastructure elements is curtailed by the limited 
capacities of the batteries and the limited fuel storage of the plants to provide 
an uninterrupted supply of electricity and grid independence. In view of the im-
mense need and growing competition for fuel, even a nationwide extension of 
the capacities of stationary and mobile emergency power generators would at 
the most result in an improved sustainability of critical components of the infra-
structure in individual localities for a limited amount of time.
A more far-reaching perspective for a sustainable improvement in the robustness 
of the (emergency) power supply would be offered by the idea of utilizing island-
ing. By utilizing decentralized networked power generators, regionally limited 
islands of power could continue to produce electricity following a power outage. 
Even a local development and extension of such islands limited to the public 
institutions that are very important for coping with an emergency – especially 
on the basis of regenerative energy – could lead to a strengthened resilience of 
the power supply and thus of the critical components of the infrastructure. For 
this reason, the suggestion is made that the technical and economic viability be 
examined in a model project.
RAISING THE SOCIETY’S AWARENESS AND INFORMING THE PUBLIC
There is a substantial deficit in the degree to which the public is aware of the 
consequences of a prolonged power outage. The power supply, although a criti-
cal component of our infrastructure, is not a topic for the public.The public does 
not pay attention to the possibility of a power outage or to the consequences of 
an interruption of the power supply. Any personal experience of a power outage 
is usually quickly forgotten.
Disasters such as power outages are usually associated with extreme weather 
events and terrorism. Since the occurrence of natural events is perceived as be-
ing inevitable, and since terrorism is met with a type of fatalism, the individual 
assumes that he or she cannot make preparations for meeting these presumed 
sole causes. Consequently, there has not been any noteworthy preparation by 
the public for a power outage, and in this sense the capacity for coping with its 
consequences is inadequate. Considering the limited awareness for the risk of a 
power outage and the dangers posed by one, we should consider how we can use 
information and counseling to arouse and maintain the public’s interest in order 
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to be able to appeal to the public in the appropriate manner in a crisis situation. 
A scientifically grounded strategy for communicating with the public about the 
risks posed by a power outage should at least be prepared before there is one. In 
this strategy, the citizens should not be viewed as passive victims of a catastrophe 
but as competent and active actors.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of the consequences of a prolonged and widespread power outage has 
shown that even after a few days it is no longer possible to ensure that goods and 
services that are vitally necessary to the public are supplied as needed through-
out the area affected. The public security is endangered, and the government can 
no longer meet its legally anchored obligation to protect the life and well-being 
of its citizens. The probability of a prolonged power outage affecting the area of 
several states may be minimal. Yet if one were to occur, the consequences that 
it would trigger would amount to a national catastrophe. Even the mobilization 
of all internal and external organizations and resources would not make the ca-
tastrophe manageable, but at most lessen its impact.
Further efforts must be made at all levels to improve the resilience of the sectors 
of the critical infrastructure over the short and medium term and to further op-
timize the capacities of the national system of disaster management. As a classic 
example of the cascading effects of damage, a power outage should therefore 
continue to have high priority on the agenda of those responsible in politics and 
society. One reason is to increase the[awareness of the economic sphere and the 
public for this topic. The TAB report presented here should make a contribution 
to this effort.
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